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This paper summarizes and elaborates on some of the results in [14]. The summary consists of a short
version of the derivation of the intuitionistic quantum logic LQM (which was originally introduced in
[6]). The elaboration consists of extending this logic to a classical logic CLQM . Some first steps are
then taken towards setting up a probabilistic framework based on CLQM in terms of Re´nyi’s condi-
tional probability spaces. Comparisons are then made with the traditional framework for quantum
probabilities.
1 Introduction
In the Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics (QM), a quantum probability function is a function
P from the lattice L(H ) of projection operators acting on the Hilbert space H , to the unit interval [0,1],
which satisfies the rules
• P(1) = 1,
• P(P1∨P2∨ . . .) =P(P1)+P(P2)+ . . . whenever PiPj = 0 for all i 6= j.
This characterization of quantum probabilities is reminiscent (at least in form) of the classical structure,
where a probability function is specified by a pair (F ,P) where F denotes a σ -algebra of subsets of
some space Ω and P : F → [0,1] is a function which satisfies
• P(Ω) = 1,
• P(∆1∪∆2∪ . . .) =P(∆1)+P(∆2)+ . . . whenever ∆i∩∆ j =∅ for all i 6= j.
Because of the resemblance in structure between the two definitions, it is tempting to think that one
must be able to find resemblances between admissible interpretations of the probabilities. However, as
indicated in [27], such a program has to face the problem of explaining the non-Boolean nature of L(H ).
This issue may best be understood by contrasting the quantum structure with the classical structure
of σ -algebras. By far the majority of philosophical approaches to classical probability agree on one
thing. Namely, that the probability P(∆) can be understood as the probability that some proposition
S∆ codified by ∆ is true. For example, if Ω is understood as the set of all possible worlds, then ∆
corresponds to the subset of all possible worlds in which S∆ is true. The question for the quantum case
is now straightforward: if the elements of L(H ) correspond to propositions, what do these propositions
express?
The most prominent early contribution to this question is undoubtedly the work of Birkhoff and von
Neumann [3]. The backbone of this paper already appeared in [18] where the idea of taking projections
as propositions was introduced. It is roughly motivated as follows. If A is an observable, and ∆ a
(measurable) subset of the reals, then the proposition A∈∆ is taken to be true if and only if the probability
that a measurement of A reveals some value in ∆ equals one. This is then the case if and only if the state
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of the system lies in P∆A H , with H the Hilbert space describing the system, and PA the projection valued
measure generated by A. Or, in terms of density operators, if and only if Tr(ρP∆A ) = 1.
Of course this raises the question of what is meant by “a measurement of A reveals some value in
∆”. The most tempting answer is the one suggested by the notation A ∈ ∆, i.e., that a measurement
of A reveals some value in ∆ if and only if the observable A has some value in ∆, independent of the
measurement. A straightforward adoption of this realist reading is bound to run into difficulties posed
by results such as the Kochen-Specker theorem [16] or the Bell inequalities [2, 7]. A possible escape is
to deny that A ∈ ∆ expresses a proposition (or has a truth value) for every pair (A,∆) at every instant.
This can be done by, for example, adopting the strong property postulate (A has a value if and only if
the system is in an eigen state of A). Another possibility is to deny the bijection between observables
and self-adjoint operators such as in Bohmian mechanics, where position observables play a privileged
role.1 Or one may suggest that these propositions do not obey the laws of classical logic. This last
option was the one suggested by Putnam in [21]. He argued that, apart from coinciding with a set of
propositions about values possessed by observables, the lattice L(H ) also describes the correct logic for
these propositions. However, this realist interpretation of the quantum logic L(H ) is known to lead to
problems [10, 26] and the consensus seems to be that there is no hope for this direction [17].
In contrast to these difficulties encountered in realist approaches to understanding L(H ), it is often
thought that an operationalist interpretation is unproblematic, and perhaps even straightforward:
If we put aside scruples about ‘measurement’ as a primitive term in physical theory, and
accept a principled distinction between ‘testable’ and non-testable properties, then the fact
that L(H ) is not Boolean is unremarkable, and carries no implication about logic per se.
Quantum mechanics is, on this view, a theory about the possible statistical distributions of
outcomes of certain measurements, and its non-classical ‘logic’ simply reflects the fact that
not all observable phenomena can be observed simultaneously. – Wilce [27, §2]
The idea is that the task of interpreting the structure of L(H ) is tied up with explicating the notion of
measurement. Then, since the operationalist takes the notion of measurement as primitive, the structure
of L(H ) may also be taken as primitive. This line of reasoning seems unsatisfactory to me and I think
that the questions of what the propositions in L(H ) express, and what the logic is that governs them, are
also meaningful and require study from an operationalist point of view. And as a guide to such a logic
one may take into account Bohr’s demand that
all well-defined experimental evidence, even if it cannot be analyzed in terms of classical
physics, must be expressed in ordinary language making use of common logic. – Bohr [4]
In this paper I continue the work done in [14] to meet this demand. Specifically, in section 2 I first
introduce a lattice of experimental propositions SQM which is then extended to an intuitionistic logic LQM
in section 3. These results comprise a summary of some of the results in [14]. Then, also in section 3,
this logic is extended to a classical logic CLQM for experimental propositions. In section 4 Re´nyi’s theory
of conditional probability spaces [23] is applied to CLQM and it is shown that the quantum probabilities
as given by the Born rule can be reproduced. This is followed by a short discussion on the issue that
non-quantum probabilities are also allowed in this framework. Finally, in section 5, the results of this
paper are evaluated and some ideas on what further role they may play in foundational debates are given.
1In this approach, observables are associated with functions on the configuration space of particle positions. Every propo-
sition A ∈ ∆ then reduces to a proposition on particle positions. This reduction is contextual in a sense; the function associated
with A is not the same for every experimental setup used to measure A.
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2 The lattice of experimental propositions
The idea to focus on the experimental side of QM is reminiscent of the approach of Birkhoff and von
Neumann in [3]. They start by introducing ‘experimental propositions’ which are identified with subsets
of ‘observation spaces’. An observation space is the Cartesian product of the spectra of a set of pairwise
commuting observables. However, once such a subset is associated with a projection operator in the fa-
miliar way, the experimental context (i.e., the set of pairwise commuting observables) is no longer being
considered. For example, one may have that P∆1A1 = P
∆2
A2 even though A1 and A2 may be incompatible.
This indicates that whatever is encoded by propositions in L(H ), they do not refer to actual experiments.
To avoid a cumbersome direct discussion of L(H ), it is then appropriate to instead develop a logic
of propositions that do encode these experimental contexts. As an elementary example of what Bohr
may have had in mind when speaking of “well-defined experimental evidence” I take propositions of the
form
MA(∆) = “A is measured and the result lies in ∆.” (1)
Of course, no logical structure can be derived for these propositions without some structural assumptions.
I will adopt the following two assumptions which I believe to be quite innocent2 :
LMR (Law-Measurement Relation) If A1 and A2 are two observables that can be measured together,
and if f is a function such that whenever A1 and A2 are measured together the outcomes a1 and
a2 satisfy a1 = f (a2) (i.e., f represents a law), then a measurement of A2 alone also counts as a
measurement of A1 with outcome f (a2).3
IEA (Idealized Experimenter Assumption) Every experiment has an outcome, i.e., for every observable
A MA(∅) is understood as a contradiction.
The following lemma describes the structure arising from these assumptions for QM. A more elaborate
exposition may be found in [14].
Lemma 2.1. Under the assumptions LMR and IEA the set of (equivalence classes of) experimental
propositions for quantum mechanics lead to the lattice
SQM := {(A ,P) ; A ∈ A,P ∈ L(A )\{0}}∪{⊥}, (2)
where A denotes the set of all Abelian operator algebras on H and L(A ) the Boolean lattice A ∩L(H ).
The partial order is given by
(A1,P1)≤ (A2,P2) iff P1 = 0 or A1 ⊃A2,P1 ≤ P2. (3)
Proof. A proposition MA1(∆1) implies MA2(∆2) if and only if a measurement of A1 implies a measure-
ment of A2 and every outcome in ∆1 implies an outcome in ∆2 for the measurement of A2 (or if MA1∆1
expresses a contradiction). By LMR, this is the case if and only if the Abelian algebra A 2 generated by
A2 is a subalgebra of the Abelian algebra A 1 generated by A1 and P∆1A1 ≤ P
∆2
A2 (or P
∆1
A1 = 0). This also
establishes that MA1(∆1) and MA2(∆2) are equivalent if and only if (A1,P
∆1
A1 ) = (A2,P
∆2
A2 ) (or both express
a contradiction).
2These assumptions are the ones also adopted in [14] although there the second was implicit and the first was formulated to
also apply to other theories.
3This assumption is reminiscent of the FUNC rule adopted in the Kochen-Specker theorem (c.f. [22, p.121]). However,
FUNC is a much stronger assumption stating that whenever measurement outcomes for a pair of observables satisfy a functional
relation, the values possessed by these observables must satisfy the same relationship. That is, FUNC is the conjunction of LMR
together with the idea that measurements reveal pre-existing values.
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The meet on SQM is given by
(A1,P1)∧ (A2,P2) =
{
(Alg(A1,A2),P1∧P2), if [A1,A2] = 0,P1∧P2 6= 0,
⊥, otherwise,
(4)
where P1∧P2 is the meet on L(H ). It is consistent with the interpretation given to MA(∆) in the sense
that this meet ‘distributes’ over the ‘and’ in “A is measured and the result lies in ∆”. In particular, it
assigns a contradiction to a simultaneous measurement of two observables whenever their corresponding
operators do not commute.
It is harder to interpret the join on this lattice as a disjunction. When restricting to joins of two
elements of SQM with the same algebra, the results seem intuitively correct. In this case one has
(A ,P1)∨ (A ,P2) = (A ,P1∨P2). (5)
And indeed, “A is measured and the measurement reveals some value in ∆1 ∪∆2” sounds like a good
paraphrase of “A is measured and the measurement reveals some value in ∆1 or A is measured and
the measurement reveals some value in ∆2”. But in more general cases problems arise. For example,
one has (A1,1)∨ (A2,1) = (A1 ∩A2,1). Then, if the two algebras are completely incompatible (i.e.
A1∩A2 = C1), this equation states that “A1 is measured or A2 is measured” is a tautology even though
one can consider situations in which neither is measured.
The example can further be used to show that SQM is not distributive. Let A3 be a third observable
that is totally incompatible with both A1 and A2. One then has
(A3,1)∧ ((A1,1)∨ (A2,1)) = (A3,1) 6=⊥= ((A3,1)∧ (A1,1))∨ ((A3,1)∧ (A2,1)). (6)
Hence, when it comes to providing a logic that fares well with natural language, SQM doesn’t perform
much better than the original L(H ).
3 Deriving the logics LQM and CLQM
To solve the problem of non-distributivity of SQM the lattice has to be extended by formally introducing
disjunctions which in general are stronger than the join on SQM . The outcome of this process is described
by the following theorem.4
Theorem 3.1. Formally introducing disjunctions to SQM while respecting (5) results in the complete
distributive lattice
LQM =
{
S : A→ L(H ) ; S(A )∈L(A )S(A 1)≤S(A 2) whenever A 1⊂A 2
}
(7)
with partial order on LQM defined by
S1 ≤ S2 iff S1(A )≤ S2(A )∀A ∈ A (8)
giving the meet and join
(S1∨S2)(A ) = S1(A )∨S2(A ),
(S1∧S2)(A ) = S1(A )∧S2(A ).
(9)
4Again, more details may be found in [14].
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The embedding of SQM into LQM is given by5
i : (A ,P) 7→ S(A ,P), S(A ,P)(A ′) :=
{
P, A ⊂A ′,
0, otherwise.
(10)
Proof. The key to the extension of SQM to LQM lies in noting that the embedding (10) satisfies the relation
S =
∨
A ∈A
i(A ,S(A )). (11)
This gives the intended reading of elements of LQM, namely, as a disjunction of experimental proposi-
tions. By LMR it follows that i preserves the interpretation of elements of SQM . The conjunctions on
LQM further agree with those on SQM:
S(A 1,P1)∧S(A 2,P2) = S(A 1,P1)∧(A 2,P2). (12)
Further, LQM respects (5) while introducing ‘new’ elements for other disjunctions, i.e.,
S(A 1,P1)∨S(A 2,P2) ≤ S(A 1,P1)∨(A 2,P2), (13)
with equality if and only if either P1 or P2 equals 0, or A 1 = A 2. Finally, that LQM is a complete
distributive lattice follows from (9) and observing that L(A ) is a complete distributive lattice for every
A ∈ A.
The lattice LQM is turned into a Heyting algebra by obtaining the relative pseudo-complement in the
usual way:
S1 → S2 =
∨
{S ∈ LQM ; S∧S1 ≤ S2} . (14)
And negation is introduced by ¬S := S → ⊥ thus obtaining an intuitionistic logic for reasoning with
experimental propositions. The logic LQM is also a proper Heyting algebra and, in fact, is radically non-
classical. That is, the law of excluded middle only holds for the top and bottom element. This is easily
checked by observing that S(C1) = 1 if and only if S =⊤. It then follows that S∨¬S =⊤ if and only if
S =⊤ or ¬S =⊤.
The strong non-classical behavior can be understood by noting that the logic is entirely built up from
propositions about performed measurements. The negation of MA(∆) is identified with other propositions
about measurements that exclude the possibility of MA(∆) but leave open the option of no experiment
having been performed:
¬S(A ,P) =
∨{
S(A ′,P′) ; [A ′,A ] 6= 0 or P′∧P = 0
}
. (15)
An unexcluded middle thus presents itself as the proposition ¬MA=“A is not measured”. It was suggested
in [14, §2] that incorporating such propositions could lead to a classical logic. I will now show that this
is indeed the case.
It is tempting to start the program for a classical logic for experimental propositions by formally
adding the suggested propositions ¬MA and building on from there. However, it turns out that it is much
more convenient to introduce new elementary experimental propositions, namely
M!A(∆) = “A is measured with result in ∆, and no finer grained measurement has been performed”.
(16)
5For notational convenience (A ,0) is identified with ⊥∈ SQM .
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The notion of fine graining here relies on LMR. Another way of expressing the conjunct added is to
state that “only A and all the observables implied to be measured by the measurement of A have been
measured”. With this concept the following can now be shown.6
Theorem 3.2. The classical logic for experimental propositions is given by7
CLQM = P(S!QM), S!QM :=
{
(A !,P) ; A ∈ A,P ∈ L0(A )
}
, (17)
where L0(A ) denotes the set of atoms of the lattice L(A ).
Proof. Being defined as a power set, it is clear that CLQM is a classical propositional lattice. So it only
has to be shown that every element signifies an experimental proposition, and that it is rich enough to
incorporate the propositions already introduced by LQM. The first issue is readily established by the
identification
M!A(∆) 7→ {(A !,P) ∈ S!QM ; P ≤ µA(∆)}, (18)
with A the algebra generated by A. Identifying A with A is again justified by LMR, and IEA is incorpo-
rated by the fact that, whenever ∆ contains no elements in the spectrum of A, M!A(∆) is identified with the
empty set. Thus (18) ensures that every element of CLQM is understood as a disjunction of experimental
propositions, i.e., every singleton set in CLQM encodes a proposition of the form M!A({a}).
That CLQM is indeed rich enough follows by observing that the map
c : LQM →CLQM, S 7→
⋃
A ∈A
{
(A !,P) ∈ S!QM ; P ≤ S(A )
} (19)
is an injective complete homomorphism.
Some additional reflections are helpful to get a grip on CLQM. First one may note that the map
(c◦ i) : SQM →CLQM, encoding propositions of the form MA(∆), acts as
c◦ i : (A ,P) 7→
{
(A ′!,P′) ∈ S!QM ; (A ′,P′)≤ (A ,P)
}
. (20)
Thus the provision “and no finer grained measurement has been performed” that distinguishes M!A(∆)
from MA(∆) precisely excludes all the (A ′!,P′) ∈ (c ◦ i)(A ,P) with A ′ 6= A , i.e., the finer grained
measurements (c.f. (18) and (20)).
The non-classicality of LQM is also explicated by CLQM. For any (A ,P) ∈ SQM, the complement of
c(S(A ,P)∨¬S(A ,P)) (21)
consists of all the (A ′!,P′) ∈ S!QM with A
′ (A and P′ ≤ P. This is because only the added provision
in (16) makes (A ′!,P′) exclude the measurement of A, while within LQM there is nothing to denote a
possible incompatibility for A and A′. A proposition in CLQM of special interest in this context is the
singleton {(C1,1)} which expresses that only the trivial measurement is performed. In light of IEA this
is just the same as saying that no measurement is performed; the most typical proposition in CLQM not
present in LQM.
6In the remainder of this paper it is tacitly assumed that H is finite-dimensional.
7The exclamation mark is merely a notational artifact introduced to discern the elements of S!QM from those of SQM . That
is, without the exclamation mark, S!QM would be a subset of SQM .
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To conclude this section I compare the constructions of LQM and CLQM to another way of extending
SQM to a distributive lattice, namely, by using the Bruns-Lakser theory of distributive hulls [5] as advo-
cated in [8]. In this approach SQM is embedded into the lattice of its distributive ideals8 DI (SQM) by
taking each element to its downward set, i.e.,
(A ,P) 7→↓ (A ,P) := {(A ′,P′) ∈ SQM ; (A ′,P′)≤ (A ,P)}. (22)
Generally, the abstract nature of the extension DI (L) for some non-distributive lattice L prevents a
straightforward identification of distributive ideals with propositions. In the present situation, for exam-
ple, it is not immediately clear whether the resulting lattice operations behave consistently with respect
to the intended reading of the elements ↓ (A ,P) given by (1). Fortunately, this issue can be resolved
for SQM by noting that the resulting lattice of its distributive ideals is isomorphic to the power set of the
atoms in SQM:
DI (SQM)≃P(S∗QM), S∗QM := {(A ,P) ∈ SQM ; A ∈ Amax,P ∈ L0(A )}, (23)
where Amax is the set of maximal Abelian algebras. Here then one sees that the proposition identified
with (A ,P) ∈ SQM is understood in P(S∗QM) as a disjunction over all possible complete measurements
compatible with a measurement of A. That is, MA(∆) in this setting may be rephrased as “some complete
measurement A′ has been performed with outcome a′ which implies MA(∆)”. Although this provides a
consistent reading, the underlying presupposition that every measurement in fact constitutes a complete
measurement seems somewhat reckless.
4 Quantum logic and probability
If the logic CLQM is to play any significant role in quantum mechanics, it has to be connected with
quantum probability theory. That is, one has to know how the Born rule can be expressed using the
language of CLQM. Ideally this consists of two parts. First, to show that probability functions on CLQM
can be introduced that are in accordance with the Born rule. And secondly, to show that the Born rule
comes out as a necessary consequence holding for all probability functions on CLQM (i.e., a result similar
to Gleason’s theorem for L(H ) ([12])). In this section some first investigations in this direction are made.
The first approach for probabilities on CLQM undoubtedly is to note that (S!QM ,CLQM) is a measure
space. Hence, it is tempting to state that all probability functions are simply all probability measures
on this space. However, this does not do justice to the quantum formalism. For example, one possible
probability measure is the Dirac measure peaked at {(C1,1)} expressing certainty that no measurement
will be performed. This is likely to be too minimalistic even for the hardened instrumentalist. That
is, although one may adhere to the idea that ‘unperformed experiments have no results’ [19], a central
idea in QM is that possible outcomes for measurements do have probabilities irrespective of whether
the measurements are performed. Indeed, it is a trait of QM that certain conditional probabilities have
definite values even if the propositions on which one conditions have prior probability zero. The Dirac
measure does not provide these conditional probabilities.
8A distributive ideal is a subset I ⊂ SQM that is downward closed and further contains the join ∨{(A ,P) ∈ J} for every
subset J ⊂ I that satisfies
(∨
(A ,P)∈J(A ,P)
)
∧ (A ′,P′) =
∨
(A ,P)∈J
(
(A ,P)∧ (A ′,P′)
)
for all (A ′,P′) ∈ SQM .
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To get around this it is natural to take conditional probabilities as primitive in the quantum case.9 For
this approach the axiomatic scheme of Re´nyi is an appropriate choice.10
Definition 4.1. Let (Ω,F ) be a measurable space and C ⊂F\{∅} be a non-empty set, then (Ω,F ,C ,P)
is called a conditional probability space (CPS) if P : F ×C → [0,1] satisfies
1. for every C ∈ C the function A 7→ P(A|C) is a probability measure on (Ω,F ),
2. for all A,B,C ∈F with C,B∩C ∈ C one has
P(A∩B|C) =P(A|B∩C)P(B|C). (24)
If in addition to these criteria C is closed under finite unions, the space is called an additive CPS, and if
C = F\{∅} it is called a full CPS.
In the present situation it is straightforward to take (S!QM ,CLQM) as the measure space. For the
set of conditions a modest choice is to take the set of propositions expressing the performance of a
measurement:
CQM := {FA ; A ∈ A} , FA := (c◦ i)(A ,1). (25)
For this set of conditions the Born rule can easily be captured with the CPS (S!QM ,CLQM,CQM,Pρ) with
the probability function given by
Pρ(F|FA ) := ∑{
P∈L(H ) ;
(A !,P)∈F
}Tr(ρP), (26)
for F ∈CLQM and with ρ a density operator on H .11
It would however be more interesting to take C =CLQM\{∅} for the set of conditions. At the present
it is not clear to me if this is possible, as extending the set of conditions seems a non-trivial matter. There
is a positive result on this matter however, namely, the CPS (S!QM ,CLQM,CQM,Pρ) can be extended to
an additive CPS. The proof for this claim relies on the following definition and theorem.
Definition 4.2. A family of measures (µi)i∈I on (Ω,F ) is called a generating family of measures for
the CPS (Ω,F ,C ,P) if and only if for all C ∈ C there exists i ∈ I such that 0 < µi(C) < ∞ and for all
F ∈F , for all C ∈ C and for all i ∈ I with 0 < µi(C)< ∞
P(F |C) = µi(F ∩C)µi(C)
. (27)
9Quantum mechanics has even been used as an example to advocate that conditional probability should be considered more
fundamental than unconditional probability, c.f. [13].
10C.f., [23]. A similar axiomatic approach was developed independently by Popper [20, A *ii–*v]. The present presentation
is taken from [25].
11Another possibility is to take for the conditions the set of propositions expressing the performance of a measurement
excluding the possibility of a finer grained measurement:
C
!
QM :=
{
F !A ; A ∈ A
}
, F !A := {(A
!
,P) ∈ S!QM ; P ∈ L(A )}.
Also in this setting the Born rule can be recovered by taking the CPS (S!QM ,CLQM,C !QM ,P
!
ρ ) with the probability function
given by
P
!
ρ (F |F
!
A ) := ∑{
P∈L(H ) ;
(A !,P)∈F
}Tr(ρP) =Pρ (F|FA ).
Much of the remainder of this section can also be phrased in terms of this CPS. I will however restrict myself to (26) for the
sake of clarity.
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The family is called dimensionally ordered if and only if there is a total order < on I such that for all
F ∈F and i, j ∈ I: i < j µ j(F) = 0 whenever µi(F)< ∞.
Theorem 4.1 (Csa´sza´r 1955 [9]). A CPS (Ω,F ,C ,P) can be extended to an additive CPS (Ω,F ,C ′,P′)
(i.e., C ⊂C ′, and P′ acts as P when restricted to F ×C ) if and only if it is generated by a dimensionally
ordered family of measures on (Ω,F ).
Thus to show that the CPS given by Pρ in (26) can be extended to an additive CPS it suffices to give
a dimensionally ordered family of measures that generates it. The construction of this family relies on
the following dimensionality function
d : A→ N, d(A ) := #L0(A ),
d : CLQM → N, d(F) := min{d(A ) ; (A !,P) ∈ F}.
(28)
That is, d picks out the coarsest measurements in F . In particular, d(FA ) = d(A ). The family of
measures
(
µρi
)
i∈N is now defined as
µρi (F) := δid(F) ∑{
P∈L(H ) ;∃A ∈A s.t.
(A !,P)∈F,d(A )=i
}Tr(ρP), (29)
where δid(F) denotes the Kronecker delta. This Kronecker delta warrants that the family is indeed dimen-
sionally ordered where the order is the usual one on N. Using that
µρi (FA ) = δid(A ) (30)
one may easily check that this is indeed a generating family for the CPS (S!QM ,CLQM,CQM,Pρ).
Another open issue with the CPS approach to quantum probabilities is that of deriving the Born rule,
i.e., to derive the conditions under which P is of the form Pρ . A particular difficulty here is that quantum
probabilities are non-contextual, a property that is not expected to hold in general for an admissible
probability function on (S!QM ,CLQM). That is, one may have that for A 1,A 2 ⊃A the equality
P
(
{(A !,P)}
∣∣FA 1)= P({(A !,P)}∣∣FA 2) , (31)
does not hold, although it is satisfied for the Born rule (26).
Conversely, if in addition to (31) the equality
P
(
{(A !1,P)}
∣∣FA )= P({(A !2,P)}∣∣FA ) (32)
were also to hold whenever A 1,A 2 ⊂A , the Born rule would follow.12 This is because then the function
PQM : L(H )→ [0,1], PQM(P) := P
(
{(A !,P)}
∣∣FA ′) (33)
with A ′ ⊃A is well defined (i.e., independent of the choice of A and A ′) and satisfies
• PQM(1) = 1,
• PQM(P1∨P2∨ . . .) = P(P1)+P(P2)+ . . . whenever PiPj = 0 for all i 6= j.
12Provided that the dimension of H is greater than 2.
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Hence, Gleason’s theorem applies.
Now, before coming to an end it is interesting to take a quick look at the connection between possible
extensions of the CPSs and Bell inequalities. Consider the standard EPR-Bohm situation where Alice
can choose between two possible measurements AA1 and AA2 , whilst Bob can choose between two possible
measurements AB1 and AB2 . Let A i j denote the algebra generated by A Ai and A Bj . It is further presupposed
that each measurement has two possible outcomes associated with the projections PXi0 and PXi1 in A Xi .
The CPSs given by (26) aren’t rich enough to evaluate possible derivations for a Bell inequality. For
that, the set of conditions has to be extended to
C
′
QM :=
{
F(A ,P) ; (A ,P) ∈ SQM
}
, F(A ,P) := (c◦ i)(A ,P). (34)
With these conditions the requirements of outcome independence (OI) and parameter independence (PI)
from which the Bell inequality can be derived [15, 24] can be stated:
P
(
{(A A!i ,P
A
i0)}
∣∣F(A i1,1))= P({(A A!i ,PAi0)}∣∣F(A i2,1))
P
(
{(A B!i ,P
B
i0)}
∣∣F(A 1i,1))= P({(A B!i ,PBi0)}∣∣F(A 2i,1)) (PI)
P
(
{(A A!i ,P
A
i0)}
∣∣∣F(A i j ,1))= P({(A A!i ,PAi0)}∣∣∣F(A i j ,PBjk)
)
P
(
{(A B!i ,P
B
i0)}
∣∣∣F(A ji,1))= P({(A B!i ,PBi0)}∣∣∣F(A ji,PAjk)
)
.
(OI)
The violation of Bell inequalities in QM shows that OI must fail for any extension of Pρ to C ′QM. This
may be indicative of the idea that the development of any full CPS (S!QM ,CLQM,CLQM\{∅},P) is a
non-trivial matter.13
5 Conclusion and outlook
With the construction of CLQM a concrete formalism is provided that adheres to the Bohrian view that also
for quantum mechanics experimental reports must be communicable in unambiguous common language.
However, the association with the Copenhagen doctrine ends there. Although the notion of measurement
is taken as primitive here, no demand is made for the necessity of this. That is, the current program
should not be seen as a method to dismiss the measurement problem, but merely as a way of making
sense of the formalism without endorsing a particular solution to the problem. In this paper one obstacle
in such investigations has been overcome, namely, the non-distributivity of quantum logic. In return a
less abstract obstacle has emerged, namely, the justification of the Born rule in quantum mechanics. To
get a further grip on this issue it may be fruitful future work to seek connections with other programs
in quantum foundations such as generalized probability theory [1] or the Bayesian approach to quantum
probabilities [11].
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